(i) these resources are critical with respect to the correct functioning of the ent,ire system and (ii) services need to be protect,ed from each ot,her making uncont,rolled interference impossible.
The multiple-server approach An obvious (and well-known) solut,ion: use mult>iple servers, protect them by classical operating syst,ern mechanisms, i.e. address spa.ces, and make t,hern freely att,achable t.0 applications. Basically, that is t,he pkernel approach, pioneered by Amoeba, Mach and Chorus. further developed by L4 [Liedtke 19951, Fluke [Ford et al. 19961 and others. This method i s best-suited to incorporat,e general. well-known software techniques for extensibility. Functionally, it, i s most flexible and most, genera.].
However, good performance of the multiple-server technique requires that the direct and indirect cost,s of cross-address-space communication (including addressspace switching) are sufficiently low. Unfort,unately. years ago, IPC was considered to be expensive.
The grafting approach
A further solution i s to graft additional modules into the monolithic server (the operating system). Early applications of this technique are widely used but insecure and/or of limited flexibility: mounting new file systems, adding new device drivers et cetera.
New research projects, in particular Spin [Bershad et al. 19951 and Vino [Seltzer et al. 19961 experiment with compile-time and run-time (compiler-supported) security for "grafted" kernel components. Spin [Bershad et al. 19951 inserts type-checked modules into the kernel; Vino [Seltzer et al. 19961 permits unsafe grafts and controls them by sandboxing and transactions.
Necula and Lee [1996] developed a very interesting method of controling grafts by mathmatical proofs. However, currently this method is probably not (yet?) applicable to non-toy grafts.
Which approach should be preferred?
There are two scientific criteria for cornparing the multiple-server against, tlie grafting approach: functionalit,y and performance. Liedtke [1995] showed that the p-kernel-based approach (multiple servers in multiple address spaces communicate via IPC) is at least as flexible as to modify a monolit.hic server. This includes policy extensibility since a real p-kernel is policy-free a.nd permits to implement all policies at user-level. It is still not clear wliet,lier t'he reverse stabenlent, "modifying a rrionolit#liic server always gives the same flexibility" holds.
The second, and probably the more critical question, is performance. Therefore, it is iniport,a.nt# to find the really achievable best performance of cross-address space communicat>ion. That is the hpic of this paper. Section 2.1 reports Ihe acliieved lest-case performance in the L4 pkernel on Iritel Pentium, blips R4600 a.nd DEC Alpha systems. Section 2.2 analyzes indirect costs for average and worst. cases.
Of course, this is only one side of the coin. Comparably substa,nt,iated and comparably analyzed performance results are also required for the grafting model. Currently, the reported numbers are 6 t o 80 times worse for grafting than the L4-based results (see section 3 ) . However, there is no evidence how close the reported nuinbers are to the principally achievable performance. Furtherniore, we define a bad case where half of the IPCs perform rw-y badly while the other half are bestcase. This is a reasonable worst-case approximation for very short reiiiot,e procedure calls. We assume that the calling IPC is always very bad as described above. However, t,he short remote procedure body will usually iiot conflict with the previously loaded 12 cache lines so t1ia.t the reply is a. best-case IPC.
Achieved IPC performance
To get, an impression about the influence of the various niemory systems, we measured bad-case and verybad-case costs on a 90-MHz Thinkpad without an L2 cache, a 133-MHz Server with 256-K L2 cache and a 
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